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This article utilizes a historical materialist informed framework to analyse change and 
continuity in US counterterrorism policy. Although Donald Trump’s “America First” 
discourse conveyed a “new” approach to counterterrorism, in practice his administration has 
largely reinforced pre-existing tendencies, expanding the military campaigns against ISIS and 
al-Qaeda. In accordance with America’s longstanding objectives in the global south, which 
centre on stabilizing existing patterns of capitalist political-economic relations, the US 
continues to police transnational security challenges “from below”. The article calls for 
increased sensitivity to the means-ends calculus in American statecraft. It argues that tactical 
shifts at the policy level (the means) should be situated in relation to historical considerations 
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The study of Donald Trump’s foreign policy has been closely associated with the president’s 
bombast and sloganeering. On the subject of counterterrorism,1 his virulent rhetoric has 
conveyed the sense of a fundamental discontinuity in the military response to transnational 
terrorist organisations. In place of his predecessor’s targeted war against al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates, Trump offered an existential struggle to “eradicate” what he terms “Radical Islamic 
Terrorism” (Trump, 2017). Reinforcing perceptions of change, the 2018 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism repeatedly referenced the pursuit of a “new approach” to counterterrorism 
(The White House, 2018). This article adopts a historical materialist informed framework to 
challenge this narrative. We argue that there has been an underlying continuity in the practices 
and logic of the Trump administration’s military response to transnational terrorist 
organisations. This reflects established counterterrorism policy and the system-management 
role the US plays in the international capitalist order. 
 
Consistent with his rhetoric, Trump escalated existing campaigns against ISIS and al-Qaeda. 
Yet, the underlying trend has been more evolutionary than revolutionary. Far from tearing up 
his predecessor’s “remote” counterterrorism playbook, the Trump administration has embraced 
it. There have been more drone strikes, more Special Operation Forces (SOF) raids, and a 
continued reliance on security cooperation. Trump neither pioneered these practices, nor has 
he wound down the global military response against transnational terrorist organisations. 
Additionally, as we argue, the administration’s insistence that “inter-state strategic 
competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security” (Mattis, 2018, 
p. 1) has reinforced, rather than departed from, pre-existing strategic goals. Notwithstanding 




by China’s rise, the Trump administration has remained committed to reproducing American 
primary within it.  
 
Tactical shifts in the means of Trump’s counterterrorism policy should be situated in relation 
to the structural ends of American imperialism. These structural imperatives are key to 
categorising the extent of policy change because, in contrast to the elasticity of 
counterterrorism discourse and tactics, they have proven remarkably durable, limiting the 
agential capacity of the Trump administration to radically realign US policy in accordance with 
an “America First” ideology. We argue that counterterrorism has continued to perform two key 
strategic functions during Trump’s presidency: defending the reproduction of open-door access 
to overseas markets, resources, and labour and, by extension, entrenching US structural power 
in international relations. 
 
Much of the existing debate on continuity and change in Trump’s foreign policy has focused 
on Trump’s transactional approach to post-war security partnerships, rules-based international 
trade, and multinational institutions. Trump’s counterterrorism policies, in contrast, have been 
subject to less scrutiny. Whilst empirically rich, existing studies have been light on theory, 
focusing mainly on the tactical shifts in, and the policy implications of, the military response 
to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Brands & Feaver, 2017; Kraft & Marks, 2017, pp. 109-122; 
Starr-Deelen, 2017). This is problematic for two reasons. First, like Japanese knotweed, 
counterterrorism has warped much of American foreign policy since the 9/11 attacks (Malley 
& Finer, 2018). Its study can therefore tell us much about the change/continuity problematic in 
Trump’s wider foreign policy. Second, whilst tactical changes in Trump’s counterterrorism 
policy are important, existing studies don’t address the larger question of why the 




a puzzle given Trump’s calls for a more transactional, “America First” approach to foreign 
policy. This article addressees these gaps by drawing on the historical materialist informed 
literature on contemporary American foreign policy and military intervention in the global 
south (Blakeley, 2018; Bromley, 2006; Gowan, 2006; Stokes, 2005, 2009; Stokes & Raphael, 
2010; Thomson, 2018). Underutilised in the study of American foreign policy after George W. 
Bush’s presidency, it adds to this Special Issue’s theory-driven examination of 
change/continuity in the Trump presidency by advancing an alternative political-economy 
account of the structural barriers to transformative change (Ashbee & Hurst, this volume).  
 
As we argue, Trump’s interventionist counterterrorism posture, detailed below, coheres with 
the policies of the Bush and Obama administrations. Modifications in the means of policy, as 
seen at the tactical level, reinforce strategic and structural ends that are largely unchanged in 
the longer trajectory of post-9/11 statecraft. In foregrounding the notion of a means-ends 
calculus in debates on change and continuity, we advocate greater sensitivity to the ways in 
which shifts in policy are subsumed to more deeply-rooted objectives that, in foreign policy 
terms, tend to outlast specific presidential administrations.2 This article aims to refresh earlier 
debates on the continuities in US foreign policy (see for example, Kolko, 1988) by extending 
political-economic considerations to the particularities of the Trump presidency, the emergence 
of more “remote” modalities of American military intervention (Watts & Biegon, 2017), and 
US counterterrorism strategy in an age of renewed great power competition.  
 
We begin by outlining the theoretical framework that informs our examination of US 
counterterrorism strategy. This foregrounds the structural factors that shape US 
counterterrorism efforts and mitigate against a fundamental realignment of objectives. In 




that, whilst the administration has accelerated the “militarisation” of US counterterrorism 
practices, it has largely reinforced pre-existing tendencies. In accordance with Washington’s 
longstanding objectives in the global south, which centre on stabilising existing patterns of 
capitalist political-economic relations, we detail the ways in which the US continues to police 
non-state security challenges “from below.” Increasingly, however, concerns over 
transnational terrorism are giving way to a renewed focus on “revisionist” states, namely China. 
As we discuss, this blending of state and non-state security challenges tightens Washington’s 
existing interventionist posture in the global south, and cannot be reduced to Trump and/or his 
“America First” agenda.  
 
A historical materialist informed approach to Trump’s counterterrorism policy 
 
Disappointing those who anticipated a radical realignment of American counterterrorism 
policy, Obama pursued an evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach to counterterrorism 
(Jackson, 2011; Quinn, 2011). This continuity has been explained in multiple ways. For some, 
it was the result of the War on Terror’s institutionalisation as a discursive “regime of truth” 
which “locked in” certain narratives, policies, and bureaucratic assemblages (Jackson, 2011). 
For others, it was shaped by the interplay of US relative decline and Obama’s proclivity for 
more constrained approaches to the use of force (Quinn, 2011). Domestic politics inform this 
continuity, with military operations against transnational terrorist organisations being viewed 
as “the area of greatest bipartisan consensus” in an age of deepening polarisation (Malley & 
Finer, 2018, p. 59). Although historical materialist contributions sharpened the debate over 
“empire” in the George W. Bush era (Bromley, 2006; Gowan, 2006; Stokes, 2005), recent 






When approached as a social science, historical materialism advances a more holistic 
understanding of “the international” by positioning “the political and economic as mutually 
constitutive” rather than as spheres to be analysed separately (Herring & Stokes, 2011, p. 13).3 
Historical materialist approaches are historical in their sensitivity toward the “indispensability 
of the empirical” and the importance of situating their analysis within the specific epoch of 
capitalist globalisation. They are materialist in their non-reductionist focus on the role of class 
and production in the evolution of social relations within and between states (Herring, 2013, 
pp. 45-46). The imprint of canonical thinkers such as Marx, Engels, and Lenin, among others, 
on contemporary debates on American foreign policy is uneven. Some have drawn from Robert 
Cox’s (1981) Gramscian work on hegemony to explore the role of both coercion and consent 
in the globalisation of capitalism (Biegon, 2017; Robinson, 1996),4 while Kautsky’s concept 
of “ultra-imperialism” has more recently inspired critical readings of Washington’s 
management of the liberal international order and the place of elite networks therein (Huo & 
Parmar, 2019; Parmar, 2018). These cleavages speak to richness of historical materialism as a 
social science tradition, but they also point to the challenges in applying it to discrete issues in 
international relations. Although historical materialists offer different theorisations of the 
changing relationship between capital, resistance, and power in world politics, they are united 
in an understanding that “political” and “economic” phenomena cannot be entirely separated 
from one another.  
 
This is not to imply that crude economic interests serve as a causal “transmission belt” to 
specific foreign policy outcomes. There is necessarily some “distance” between the imperatives 
of imperialism and the contingencies expressed in Trump’s counterterrorism policies. The aim 




the “[i]nterplay between state power, capitalist elite interests and the use of disciplinary state 
violence from above” (Blakeley, 2018, p. 323). This involves tracing the continuities in the 
goals, if not pretexts, of US interventionism across time, whilst remaining sensitive to the 
economic and strategic animators of such activities (Blakeley 2018; Stokes & Raphael, 2010; 
Thomson, 2018). The US has defended, deepened and, where possible, extended privileged 
access to overseas markets, resources, and labour. The maintenance of a stable investment and 
extraction climate, particularly in oil rich areas (Stokes & Raphael, 2010; Wearing, 2018), has 
been key to the reproduction of American primacy. To this end, the US has policed attempts 
by oppositional social forces—whether these have been nationalist, communist, or Islamist in 
orientation—to carve out zones of exclusion from the circuits of transnational capital, often 
reordering the political and social relations of other states to facilitate this process. This 
scholarship therefore challenges the notion of a fully “liberal” order. Although US power has 
been exercised through multilateral rules and institutions in the capitalist core of Western 
Europe, Japan and Australasia, in much of the global south “American involvement has often 
been crudely imperial” (Ikenberry, 2011, p.27). 
 
Supported by capitalist powers such as Great Britain, which has performed a key constabulary 
role in the Middle East (Wearing, 2018), the US has employed multiple forms of coercive 
statecraft to maintain stability in strategically important areas of the global south (Blakeley, 
2018). Given the informal configuration of post war American imperialism through states 
organised to be conducive to US interests, “polyarchic” forms of “low-intensity democracy” 
have been widely promoted (Robinson, 1996). During the Cold War, repressive right-wing 
regimes were supported as bulwarks against instability and Soviet influence (Kolko, 1988). In 
the 2000s and 2010s, under the guise of counterterrorism, the US continued spending billions 




2010; Thomson, 2018). Much of this assistance has been used to build the counterinsurgency 
capacity of states to police subversion within their borders, thereby insulating governments 
amicable to American interests. By “armouring” the flow of oil and other commodities onto 
global markets, the US has stabilised existing political economies in a manner that benefitted 
not only domestic elites, but the longer-term interests of key factions of US-based transnational 
capital (Stokes & Raphael, 2010). 
 
The defence of stable access to overseas markets, resources, and labour, historical materialist 
informed scholars speaks to a second core logic of contemporary American counterterrorism 
policy: reinforcing the US’s structurally dominant position within what Bromley has dubbed 
the “liberal imperialist international capitalist order” (Bromley, 2006; see also Gowan, 2006; 
Thomson, 2018, p. 22). As a construct for organising foreign policy, the War on Terror aimed 
to “lock in” US primacy. Maintaining global energy security, for example, is not only intended 
to meet the American economy’s energy needs. It also has geopolitical functions. The US gains 
structural leverage over rival nodes of capitalist accumulation—Western Europe, North 
America and South Asia—because of their reliance on the US’s provision of this international 
public good (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, pp. 1–2; Wearing, 2018, pp. 58–59). The “shale gas 
revolution,” which in recent years has driven the US’s re-emergence as a leading oil exporter, 
has not undercut this policing role. As Gilbert Achcar argues: 
 
 [c]ontrolling access to oil, especially the biggest reserves in the Arab-Iranian Gulf, 
 gives the United States a decisive strategic advantage in the battle for world 
 hegemony, putting it in a position of dominance vis-à-vis both its greater potential 
 rival, China, and also its traditional vassals, Western Europe and Japan, all heavily 





In an era of heightened greater power competition, energy-sector leverage provides structural 
power. As such, the military response to transnational terrorist organisations can be read as a 
vehicle for policing challenges to American imperialism from below—in the case of 
transnational terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State—and above—in the 
case of China, slated to become the world’s largest oil importer in the very near future 
(Wearing, 2018, p. 57).  
 
By emphasising class-based interests and economic factors within and across international 
borders, historical materialism relates changing patterns of imperialist intervention to power-
shifts in international politics. During the early period of the War on Terror, a more aggressive 
US security strategy coincided, somewhat paradoxically, with an easing of great power rivalry. 
This lead some analysts to evoke the “ultra-imperialism” first theorised by Karl Kautsky, recast 
as “super-imperialism” in more recent scholarship (Bromley, 2006; Huo & Parmar 2019; 
Parmar, 2018). In this view, US hegemony allows for “coordinated power in a liberal capitalist 
international order” (Bromley, 2006, p. 49). The imperial pursuit of “open doors and closed 
frontiers,” in Colás’ phrasing (2008), reproduces class alliances across global power-centres. 
Transnational elite networks are consolidated through the “liberal international order,” backed 
by US power (Huo & Parmar 2019; Parmar, 2018). The promotion of capitalist market relations 
based on the stability of the inter-state system becomes, to an extent, a shared project under US 
geopolitical leadership, but creates the conditions for centripetal resistance through the active 






Acknowledging divisions within the historical materialist literature in IR, our grounding within 
this critical tradition allows us to make three key contributions to debates on the Trump 
presidency. 
 
First, a historical materialist foundation encourages us to study Trump’s counterterrorism 
policies as part of a larger series of historical processes which fully began with the ascent of 
American hegemony after 1945, but which has roots in the long durée of North-South relations 
formed during the age of European colonialism (Blakeley, 2009). As Wearing argues, “[t]he 
decisions made by individual politicians at specific times are important but must ultimately be 
understood within these wider structural contexts” (2018, p. 3). To this end, historical 
materialists reject the “discontinuity” thesis which holds that either the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and/or the 9/11 attacks precipitated fundamental changes in American foreign policy. 
The contingencies captured in the post-9/11 military response to transnational terrorist 
organisations are read within the structural realities of the evolving relationship between 
American power, imperialism, and the international order established in 1945. This 
commitment to historicising Trump’s counterterrorism policy strengthens the debate on 
continuity and change. A longer-term view avoids the parochialism that magnifies tactical and 
discursive differences, creating unwarranted perceptions of “newness” when comparing Trump 
to Bush and Obama. 
 
Second, by capturing the “structural processes at work in the post war global political and 
economic system” (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, p. 10), an historical materialist informed approach 
can broaden the debate on counterterrorism policy beyond “certain hegemonic discourses” 
(Stokes, 2009, p. 88), which present US actions as serving clear-cut “national security” 




privileged the US as the key “mediator” between the established order and revisionist powers. 
In this regard, the US has not only retained the capacity to define threats to international 
security, but to outline the appropriate response (Stokes, 2009, p. 86). We aim to “relate these 
discursive practices to sustained analysis of the class and other interests and social relations 
within capitalism” (Herring & Stokes, 2011, p. 13) This focuses our analysis on the more 
durable practices and interests of the American state, rather than the more elastic discursive 
and cultural grammars which are used to “sell” these to domestic and international audiences, 
discussed elsewhere in this Special Issue (see Fermor & Holland; Hassan).  
 
And third, historical materialist perspectives on American foreign policy advance an 
alternative, political economy focused account of the structural barriers to a radical break in 
counterterrorism policy. When situated within the longue durée of North-South relations 
(Blakeley, 2009), the challenges associated with transnational terrorist organisations like al-
Qaeda and ISIS involve more than “national security,” narrowly defined. These groups also 
undermine the wider primacy of the American state by threatening to destabilise key areas of 
the global economy, particularly the Middle East (Blakeley, 2018, p. 327). In the case of global 
energy security, al-Qaeda affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic 
State have attempted to disrupt American access to Middle Eastern oil and gas reserves (Tichy 
& Eichler, 2017). By capturing territory and threatening stable governance, these groups 
disrupt the integration of fragile states into the US-led global capitalist order. Through these 
actions, transnational terrorist organisations undermine a core pillar of the US structural power 
over rival centres of capitalist accumulation, most notably China. In this respect, historical 
materialist approaches capture the often neglected political-economy drivers of US 




to markets, resources, and labor in the global south through covert warfare and the 
augmentation of internal security practices of partnering states. 
 
An “America First” approach to counterterrorism? 
 
Trump has dramatically changed the discourse of US counterterrorism policy. Whereas Obama 
sought to roll back the Bush administration’s expansive War on Terror discourse, Trump’s 
bellicosity serves as a rejection of Obama’s restraint. While running for office, Trump pledged 
to radically reorient US counterterrorism policy. Criticising the Obama administration’s 
“politically correct” approach, he claimed the “rise of ISIS” was the “direct result of policy 
decisions made by President Obama and Secretary Clinton” (Trump, 2016a). In November 
2015, Trump outlined his “plan” for defeating the Islamic State, which, following its swift 
territorial conquests in Iraq and Syria, had surpassed al-Qaeda as the principal terrorist threat 
for policymakers in Washington. Given the “tremendous amount of money” ISIS was making 
from oil sales, Trump said he “would bomb the shit out of them.” (quoted in Hains, 2015). In 
April 2016, Trump proposed plundering Iraq’s oil to reimburse American taxpayers for earlier 
occupations. “In the old days,” he stated, “when we won a war, to the victor belonged the 
spoils. Instead, all we got from Iraq—and our adventures in the Middle East—was death, 
destruction and tremendous financial loss” (Trump, 2016a). Despite opposition from some 
administrational officials, whilst in office, Trump institutionalised the controversial term 
“Radical Islamic Terrorism” (Kraft & Marks, 2017, p. 112), as referenced in the 2018 National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism (The White House, 2018). 
 
Discursively, Trump’s “America First” foreign policy intimates a more “muscular” use of 




America first, the US must avoid being “taken advantage of” in its counterterrorism 
commitments, whether by allies, international organisations or adversaries. Engendering 
concerns about the durability of the Washington’s commitment to its NATO and East Asian 
partners, Trump stated in 2016: “Our allies must contribute toward their financial, political, 
and human costs, have to do it, of our tremendous security burden (sic)... The countries we are 
defending must pay for the cost of this defense,” he added, “and if not, the US must be prepared 
to let these countries defend themselves” (Trump, 2016b). The “America First” frame is 
designed to project an image of an unabashed nationalism, conveying the sense of a clear break 
with the internationalism (or “globalism”) of recent administrations. Beyond this rhetorical 
break lies a more nuanced reality, often obscured in Trump’s personalised political style. As 
outlined below, policy is not reducible to the statements or political posturing of the 
commander-in-chief.  
 
As argued in the historical materialist literature (Stokes, 2009; Stokes & Herring, 2011), the 
instrumentalist language of political elites emerges out of ideological commitments, with the 
discursive sphere existing in dialectical relation to material and structural factors. From this 
view, “America First” is not “mere rhetoric,” but a pledge that must be adequately 
contextualised. This means examining the rhetorical and tactical shifts alongside deeper 
structural objectives. With respect to the “ends” of US foreign policy, although the notion of 
“America First” is intensely illiberal in some respects, it is not “isolationist.” The Trump 
administration remains committed to hegemony (Biegon, 2019), even as it seeks a new and 
ostensibly less burdensome arrangement within the existing order. Despite Trump’s 
eccentricities, his administration’s approach to statecraft blends security and economic 
interests and objectives in a relatively traditional manner. As we discuss in the next section, in 




policy continues to service a larger imperial agenda. In the subsequent section, we examine the 
implications of the renewed focus on rogue and revisionist states for US interventionism. The 
discussion illustrates that, notwithstanding rhetorical and tactical shifts, the Trump 
administration has maintained a means-ends calculus that is consistent with previous post-9/11 
administrations, and which is consistent with the system-management role played by the US in 
the post-war international order.  
 
The evolving military response to transnational terrorist groups 
 
In rhetorical and strategic terms, Obama outlined an end the “permanent war” associated with 
the Bush administration’s “Global War on Terror” (Kitchen, 2016). Even so, his administration 
institutionalised many of Bush’s (second-term) modifications in counterterrorism policy. 
Relying on a set of more “remote” practices of military intervention throughout the Middle 
East and Africa, the Obama administration pursued a lighter-footprint approach (Krieg, 2016; 
Watts & Biegon, 2017). The most controversial of these practices was the widespread use of 
drones to conduct reconnaissance operations and carry out targeted strikes against militant 
leaders, supported by Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployments and “train-and-equip” 
programs (Tankel, 2018b; Watts & Biegon, 2017). Throughout the Middle East and Africa, the 
Trump administration has intensified the use of multiple methods of more remote intervention 
to “defeat the terrorists who threaten America’s safety, prevent future attacks, and protect our 
national interests” (The White House, 2018, p. ii). When situated within the structural contexts 
and historical role performed by the American state in the international capitalist order, this 






Although the form of US imperialism may be in flux, the structural realities of US interests 
create continuity in Washington’s commitment to coercive statecraft. In historical materialist 
scholarship, this provides a baseline for analysing US foreign policy in the global south. 
Whether embedded in an “ultra” or “inter” imperialist logic, the United States projects military 
power to protect the reproduction of capital when and where threats emerge, but in a manner 
that is also designed to secure American primacy (Stokes & Raphael, 2010). This entails the 
use of “disciplinary violence from above” to “police” threats to sectoral and systemic economic 
interests (Blakeley, 2018, p. 323; see also Colás, 2008; Stokes, 2005). Because of the flexibility 
associated with Washington’s military advantages, the “tools” that constitute this policing role 
may vary, from drones to proxies to Special Forces (Blakeley, 2018; Thomson, 2018), even as 
the “ends” remain relatively stable. Whether targeting transnational terrorist organisations or 
rival states, the modalities of US imperialism mitigate against a wholesale retrenchment of the 
kind that some observers associate with Trumpian nationalism. 
 
In big picture terms Trump, like Obama, has rejected the logic of open-ended, large-scale 
military campaigns, a major source of continuity across the two administrations. As Trump 
puts it: “We are not nation-building again. We are killing terrorists” (Trump, 2017). The 
administration has intensified the turn toward “remote” practices of military intervention, 
loosening the various constraints on the use of force that the Trump team associated with 
Obama (Fielding-Smith & Purkiss, 2018). According to Jon Finer (2019, p. 188), who served 
under Obama, the presence of hawkish advisors within the administration overran the 
president’s noninterventionist instincts, fostering the escalation of military involvement in all 
of the major counterterrorism campaigns which Trump inherited: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, 




policy, raising renewed concerns regarding the oversight and human costs of counterterrorism 
(Kraft & Marks, 2017, p. 117; Starr-Deelen, 2017). 
 
Trump has significantly expanded the use of armed drones for targeted killing increasing both 
the strike quantity and geographic scope of these activities. As a flexible means of “imperial 
policing through air power” (Blakeley, 2018, p. 327), drone attacks have become a mainstay 
of Washington’s “unconventional” warfighting capabilities. While the Obama administration 
designated Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and parts of Libya as “areas of active hostilities,” Trump 
added Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and the entirety of Libya to the list, giving the US recourse 
to quicker turn-around times to carry out drone strikes (Malone, 2018, pp. 6-7). In Somalia, for 
example, the Trump administration escalated airstrikes against al-Shabaab in 2018 and 2019, 
with strikes targeting larger groups of suspected fighters. This was facilitated by the loosening 
of Obama-era constraints on the use of force in Somalia, as well as the drawdown of US 
military operations elsewhere (namely Syria and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan), which freed 
up drones and other resources (Schmitt & Savage, 2019). US drone and air strikes in Yemen 
also increased considerably in Trump’s first year in office (from 32 in 2016 to 131 in 2017), 
before declining to Obama-era levels (36 strikes) in 2018 (Johnsen, 2019). In January 2020, a 
Reaper drone was used to kill the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani at Baghdad International 
Airport in what the Trump administration described as “time sensitive targeting” against a 
“target of opportunity” (Capaccio, 2020). 
 
Like Obama, Trump has relied heavily on SOF, including the Defense Department’s Joint 
Special Operation Command (JSOC) which was responsible for the October 2019 raid which 
killed the ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In his first week in office, Trump authorised a 




resulting in the death of a Navy SEAL and a number of civilian causalities (Mcfadden, Arkin, 
& Uehlinger, 2017). In May 2017, a Navy SEAL was killed in a raid against al-Shabaab—the 
first US combat death in Somalia since the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident (Cooper, Savage, 
& Schmitt, 2017). During Trump’s first year as president, SOF were deployed to at least 137 
countries (Turse, 2017). The expanded use of SOF led one analyst to argue that Trump was 
“pushing America’s Special Forces past the breaking point” (Zenko, 2017). 
 
Additionally, military assistance has remained a key tool in Trump’s counterterrorism arsenal. 
As the 2018 National Counterterrorism Strategy emphasised, “augment[ing] the capabilities of 
key foreign partners to conduct critical counterterrorism activities” remains an essential 
component of the military response to transnational terrorist organisations (The White House, 
2018, p. 23). According to figures compiled by the Security Assistance Monitor, the 
administration requested a total of $11.2 billion in counterterrorism aid in FY 2019 (Goodman 
& Arabia, 2018). Whilst there have been considerable cuts to State Department-funded security 
assistance programmes during Trump’s presidency, in the case of counterterrorism initiatives, 
these have been largely offset by an uplift in DOD-funded programmes (Goodman & Arabia, 
2018). Military assistance has been integral to Washington’s support for local partners tasked 
with maintaining the stability of key areas of the global economy against challenges from 
counterhegemonic social forces (Stokes & Raphael, 2010, pp. 56-64). 
 
Conceivably, Trump could have ended campaigns against transnational groups which only 
peripherally or indirectly threaten US national security. To put America first in a manner 
consistent with the transactional, quasi-isolationist tone of his campaign rhetoric would have 
suggested that he disengage from some of the US’s security commitments in the global south. 




modifications to US strategic doctrine, this has not happened. Consistent with our historical 
materialist framework, the Trump administration has continued to police transnational terrorist 
organisations, even if the policy is sometimes at odds with Trump’s claims.  
 
The confusion surrounding US policy toward Syria is indicative of this. In early 2018, then-
Secretary of State Tillerson stated that the US would “maintain a military presence in Syria 
focused on ensuring ISIS cannot remerge,” a move that kept intact the basis of Obama’s ISIS 
policy (Goldenberg & Heras, 2018). In December 2018, Trump indicated that he was planning 
on pulling all US troops out of Syria, only to reverse course in early 2019, with a decision to 
leave a contingent in the country. Similar events transpired in the autumn of 2019. In the 
context of the impeachment inquiry by Congressional Democrats, Trump announced he would 
remove US troops from northern Syria. Criticising “endless wars,” Trump hinted at a full 
military withdrawal from the country, but the administration later clarified it was planning on 
leaving several hundred troops in Syria to “protect the oil fields” (Ward, 2019).  
 
A similar dynamic can be seen with respect to Afghanistan, where US-led combat operations 
officially ended in 2014. Trump agreed to the reintroduction of over 3,000 troops in 2017, 
despite his longstanding views in favour of “pulling out.” In September 2019, Trump revealed 
that he had been pursuing secret negotiations with the Taliban before abruptly cancelling 
meetings with its representatives. The appropriate “balance” or degree of US involvement in 
Afghanistan, as in Iraq and Syria, continues to be debated in Washington, but it is clear that the 
Trump administration has not implemented a “break” in US policy towards these major 
“hotspots.” Rather, he has effectively widened the scope of existing campaigns against ISIS, 
al-Qaeda and their various affiliates, augmenting Washington’s imperial policing role in a 





Under Trump, the United States has continued to use a blend of kinetic and non-kinetic 
counterterrorism “tools,” most illustratively demonstrated in the military response to ISIS. 
Initially, the Trump administration claimed it would deploy up to 30,000 American troops in 
the Middle East to “knock out ISIS” (Nussbaum, 2016). This did not happen. Instead, it 
persisted with a modified form of the “medium-footprint” approach pioneered under Obama: 
“an aggressive campaign encompassing air strikes, drone attacks, special operations raids, and 
small deployments of regular ground troops in response to specific threats, all in support of 
efforts by regional US partners” (Brands & Feaver, 2017, p. 28). Substantive operational 
changes were minimal (Dombrowski & Reich, 2018, p. 65). It continued to appropriate 
substantial funds to Iraqi Security Forces via the Counter-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Train 
and Equip Fund, with $1.27 billion in FY 2018 and $0.85 billion in FY 2019 (Security 
Assistance Monitor, 2019). At the same time, with respect to Syria, “the Trump administration 
instituted a policy shift by loosening the rules of engagement to allow larger and more risky 
strikes” (Dombrowski & Reich, 2018, p. 64). As the operational strategy was delegated to 
military commanders, the reported number civilian deaths from coalition strikes in Iraq and 
Syria jumped significantly in the first year of Trump’s presidency, before settling again in 2018 
and 2019. 
 
Why have these campaigns continued? According to the 2017 National Security Strategy 
(NSS): “Changes in a regional balance of power can have global consequences and threaten 
U.S. interests. Markets, raw materials, lines of communication, and human capital are located 
within, or move among, key regions of the world” (emphasis added: The White House, 2017, 
p. 45). For the Trump administration, American interests are threatened by the closure of open-




to the longer-term strategic benefits of combatting al-Qaeda and ISIS, as the NSS continued: 
“States that prosper and nations that transition from recipients of development assistance to 
trading partners offer economic opportunities for American businesses. And stability reduces 
threats that target Americans at home” (The White House, 2017, p. 45). In other words, and 
consistent with our historical materialist framework, by intensifying the campaigns against the 
disruptive non-state violence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Trump administration is, 
according to its own strategic logic, working to stabilise key areas of the global economy. In 
this respect, tactical changes are subsumed to a fundamental continuity in structural objectives. 
 
Counterterrorism in an age of renewed great power competition 
 
Ongoing power shifts suggest the character of US imperialism is being challenged. “As super-
imperialist leadership is eroded,” wrote Bromley in the wake of the Iraq war, “so inter-
imperialist emulation and rivalry beckon” (2006, p. 46). China’s rise is the most important 
development in this regard, as it indicates the presence of a near-peer strategic competitor. 
Although future conflict between the US and China is not inevitable, increased competition 
between major powers seems to be a core feature of the current interregnum (Babic, 2020; 
Parmar, 2018; Huo & Parmar, 2019). The tensions latent in the ultra-imperialism of the early 
War of Terror era have come firmly to fore, placing considerable strain on the managerial 
capacity of the American state to maintain its primacy in the global economic and political 
order it created after 1945. The Trump administration’s “America First” approach, which aims 
to reduce US commitments to the liberal international order, aggravates these uncertainties 
(Parmar, 2018, p. 152). The shift toward a more competitive configuration of imperial power 
has implications for wider US security strategy, as evidenced by the new focus on state-based 





Following its release in October 2018, analysts expressed “relief” at the “mainstream” 
approach outlined in the Trump administration’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism 
(Geltzer, 2018; Tankel, 2018a). There were some tactical readjustments, including a renewed 
focus on the importance of “building strong borders” (The White House, 2018, p. 1). 
Nonetheless, the strategy eschewed Trump’s divisive rhetoric “while embracing the 
institutional memory and best practices built up under his predecessor” (Geltzer, 2018). Given 
the disparity between Trump’s public comments and the document, some questioned whether 
the president was actually aware of its contents (Tankel, 2018a). The strategy’s definition of 
an “America First” approach was relatively traditional: it would be “guided by United States 
interests; shaped by realistic assessments of both our challenges and our capabilities; and 
attuned to the important roles of our allies and partners, both foreign and domestic, in our 
shared counterterrorism efforts” (The White House, 2018, p. 2). 
 
Whereas Obama’s strategy placed considerable weight on “core values” as an element of 
national interests (The White House, 2011, pp. 5-6), Trump’s placed greater emphasis on 
adversarial states, namely Iran (The White House, 2018). Read in conjunction with other 
national security documents, Trump’s counterterrorism strategy shows elements of change and 
continuity, but it also cuts a stark contrast with the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which 
maintains that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in 
US national security” (Mattis, 2018, p. 1). That document also pays homage to the importance 
of alliances and institutions but avoids altogether the “America First” frame. It does advocate 
explicitly for the construction of a more “lethal” force, however, and highlights concerns over 
budget discipline and affordability. It positions the (downgraded) terrorist threat amongst a 




and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power,” it states, while Iran is using 
“state-sponsored terrorist activities” to vie for “regional hegemony” (Mattis, 2018, p.  2).  
 
Similarly, the administration’s NSS, released in December 2017, links concerns regarding 
transnational terrorism to geostrategic issues involving states: 
 
 “Three main sets of challengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the 
 rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, 
 particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States 
 and our allies and partners. Although differing in nature and magnitude, these rivals 
 compete across political, economic, and military arenas, and use technology and 
 information to accelerate these contests in order to shift regional balances of power” 
 (The White House, 2017, p. 25). 
 
The strategy outlined an interventionist posture that is entirely consistent with those of previous 
post-9/11 administrations. As with every iteration of the NSS since the Clinton administration, 
Trump’s version foregrounds economic policy, even as it adopts a more nationalist and, at 
times, neo-mercantilist position. The active promotion of “American prosperity” is enumerated 
as a “pillar” of US strategy. “An America First National Security Strategy,” it states, 
“appreciates that America will catalyze conditions to unleash economic success for America 
and the world” (The White House, 2017, p. 4). This is to be achieved through “a stable 
international economic system rooted in American principles of reciprocity, free markets, and 
free trade.” (The White House, 2017, p. 17). To undercut the appeal of jihadist terrorism, the 
US will encourage states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia “to continue modernizing their 




document emphasises shared responsibilities and the ability of partners to “work independently 
of US assistance” (The White House 2017, p. 11). The document calls on the US to “embrace 
energy dominance” while helping “allies and partners become more resilient against those that 
use energy to coerce” (The White House 2017, pp. 22-23). As argued in the historical 
materialist scholarship (Stokes & Raphael, 2010; Wearing, 2018), by leveraging energy 
security at the global level, the US reinforces its structural power in international relations.  
 
From before the onset of the War on Terror, efforts to “police the periphery” have been 
constitutive of a larger imperial project to coordinate power in the internationalist capitalist 
order. As Simon Bromley wrote in the context of debates over the Bush Doctrine, “the stability 
of the capitalist world depends upon the performance of certain global political functions,” 
including “stabilising the periphery” and “combating transnational ideological challenges,” so 
as to “uphold the common interests of different, and potentially rival, capitalist classes and 
states” (2006, 50). The precise relationship between this policing function and the inter-state 
system is a source of disagreement, with scholars offering competing interpretations of the 
nature of imperialism in the global capitalist order (Gowan, 2006; Parmar, 2018; Stokes, 2005; 
Thomson, 2018, pp. 16–29). Where there is consensus is that “US hegemony has played, and 
continues to play, a key role in bringing this order into being” (Bromley, 2006, p. 52)—and 
that military power is vital to the maintenance of this hegemonic arrangement. Since 9/11, the 
exercise of military power has been organised and justified mainly through the practices and 
guises of counterterrorism. A recalibration towards “great powers” may be a notable 
development, but the explicit blending of threats from transnational terrorist groups and states 
is not new. Overall, these trends have little to do with Trump himself, and serve as a reminder 







Through his rhetoric, candidate Trump insisted that his presidency would lead to a fundamental 
change in Washington’s approach to counterterrorism. As a component of his “America First” 
foreign policy, Trump’s “hard line” approach to transnational terrorism coexisted with neo-
isolationist and burden-sharing appeals, with calls that partners “do more” in the fight against 
“Radical Islamic Extremism.” Without diminishing the significance of Trump’s discourse, 
however, it is clear that there has been considerable continuity in both the practices and 
functions of his administration’s counterterrorism policies. Despite Trump’s idiosyncratic 
style, he has not departed from the counterterrorism “playbook” he inherited from his 
predecessor. This pertains not only to the objectives of US counterterrorism efforts, it also 
holds true for the prominent place of counterterrorism practices within the wider goals of 
American statecraft.  
 
To be sure, the transition from Obama to Trump saw some modifications in the tactical details 
of US counterterrorism policy. These generally tracked to Trump’s more bellicose discourse. 
His administration widened the use of armed drones, deepened the use of SOF and expanded 
DOD funding for counterterrorism-related security cooperation programmes. In these respects, 
it has bolstered the “remote” tactics of counterterrorism that have increasingly shaped 
American foreign policy. In terms of the applications of US military power, the big picture has 
been one of continuity. Intensified campaigns against ISIS and al-Qaeda are part of a broader 
set of managerial practices in which the US continues to police the greater Middle East from 
disruptive non-state violence “from below.” This suggests that, particularly in the context of 
the renewed focus on “revisionist” states, scholars would do well to maintain sensitivity to the 





The lack of a fundamental shift in US counterterrorism policy suggests Trump’s agential 
capacity to radically realign US policy is limited. By revisiting and updating the historical 
materialist literature on the “War on Terror,” we argue that this is due in part to the structural 
imperatives associated with US imperialism, which, beyond simply “blocking” presidents from 
overhauling US policy in accordance with their own agendas, elicits interventionist policies in 
the global south designed to stabilise existing patterns of political-economic relations. 
Mediated through shifting strategies at the executive level (framed in Trump’s case around his 
America First agenda), these structural factors continue to impact US foreign policymaking in 
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1 In addition to intensifying the military response to transnational terrorist organisations—this 
article’s primary focus—the Trump administration has also securitised border control and 
immigration policy through the language of counterterrorism.  
2 In making this argument, we are not dismissing the contention developed elsewhere in this 
special issue that Trump is a low-complexity individual (authors, this volume). As others 
have argued, whilst Trump may be an extraordinary character, his presidency, in terms of 
both outcomes and constraints, is fairly ordinary (Herbert, McCrisken & Wroe, 2019). The 
actions of the American state, with its multiple bureaucracies and agencies, are not reducible 
to the president alone. Certain ideas and habits persist across administrations, carried by the 
individuals that staff key agencies and the beliefs they hold about appropriate American 
foreign policy (Porter, 2018). As Porter notes from outside the historical materialist tradition, 
the strategy of primacy pursed by the US since 1945 has involved a focus on “creat[ing] 
conditions optimal for the penetration of US capital” and “priz[ing] open markets and 
ensur[ing]investment opportunities and access to raw materials, a pursuit of openness on 
American terms” (Porter, 2018, p. 20). 
3 As Herring notes (2013), historical materialism can be approached as a social science, a 
philosophy, and/or an emancipatory political project. As a social science, it is “assume[d] that 
fact and value (judgements of worth such as right and wrong) can be separated sufficiently to 
generate theoretically grounded claims that can be tested against evidence” (Herring, 2013, p. 
153). 
 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 As illustrated by Fermor and Holland’s contribution to this special issue, Gramscian 
concepts are not the sole preserve of historical materialist approaches. 
